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INTRODUCTION

This Article revisits the issue of whether a family law case litigant
must file a motion for rehearing to bring to the trial court's attention the
lack of factual findings in its judgment in order to preserve the issue for
appeal. In 2001, the Third District Court of Appeal in Broadfoot v.
Broadfoot' established the rule that in family law cases, a litigant may not
complain about a trial court's failure to make factual findings unless the
matter was brought to the trial court's attention in a motion for rehearing
to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct its own errors. 2 In

* Larry R. Fleurantin is a member of the Appellate Practice Section of The Florida Bar
and holds a B.A. summa cum laude (2000), Florida International University Honors College; J.D.
cum laude (2003), University of Florida Levin College of Law. Mr. Fleurantin is the managing
partner of Fleurantin, Francois & Antonin, P.A. in North Miami Beach, Florida. The firm
concentrates its practice in civil and appellate litigation, with a particular focus on personal injury,
car accidents, marital and family law, real estate, foreclosure, and immigration. The author would
like to express his gratitude to attorney Parnel D. Auguste for his comments and suggestions.
Special thanks to his wife Marie-Michelle Rousseau-Fleurantin for her unwavering support. This
Article is dedicated to UF law professor Kenneth B. Nunn who introduced the author to scholarly

research and writing.
1. 791 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
2. Id. at 585.
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2004, the Fifth District applied the Broadfoot rule in Mathieu v. Mathieu3
with one caveat commonly known as the Mathieu exception: "[I]f the
court determines on its own that its review is hampered, we may, at our
4
discretion, send the case back for findings." Back in 2005 the Fourth
5 which reached a contrary result and
District decided Dorsett v. Dorsett,
6
expressed disagreement with both Broadfoot and Mathieu.
By 2012, all Florida district courts except the Fourth District had
explicitly or implicitly followed the Broadfoot rule or the Mathieu
exception. 7 Since the state of the law regarding this preservation issue
was unclear, in a widely circulated 2012 Florida Bar Journal article, this
author argued that the Fourth District should revisit Dorsett and follow
Broadfoot and Mathieu so that all the district courts can speak with one
9
voice.8 But recently, the Fourth District decided Fox v. Fox, which reaffirmed its earlier decisions that a party may raise the issue of lack of
statutorily-required findings in alimony, equitable distribution and child
0
support cases without the need to file a motion for rehearing.1 The Fox
3. 877 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (per curiam).
4. Id, at 741 n.1.
5. 902 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
6. Id. at 950 n.3.
7. The First District embraced Broadfoot and Mathieu in Owens v. Owens, 973 So. 2d
1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The Second District acknowledged the Fourth District's
disagreement with Broadfooot and Mathieu in Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1263 & 1267 n.1
(Fla. 2d DCA 2008) where the Second District affirmed the lower court even though the judgment

below lacked the required factual findings. However, on July 3, 2019, the Second District decided
Engle v. Engle wherein the Second District joined the Fourth District's decision in Fox, which
held that "the failure to comply with the statute's requirement of factual findings is reversible

error regardless of whether a motion for rehearing is filed." Engle v. Engle, 277 So. 3d 697, 699
(Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (citing Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). In reaching
its conclusion, the Second District reviewed the line of cases from the First, Third, and Fifth
Districts that followed Ascontec Consulting, Inc. v. Young, 714 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA

1998) and Reis v. Reis, 739 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), which do not stand for the
proposition that a motion for rehearing is required to preserve the failure to make factual findings.
Engle, 277 So. 3d at 699-700. Rather, Reis and Ascontec dealt with "claims that the trial court
waited too long after an evidentiary hearing to issue its written order" and thus necessitating a
new trial since the passage of time put into question whether the trial court can correctly recall

the details of the hearing. Engle v. Engle, 277 So. 3d at 699-700. Moreover, in Allen v. Juul, the
Second District followed its own decision in Engle and certified conflict with the First District's
opinion in Owens, the Fifth District's opinion in Mathieu, the Third District's opinion in
Broadfoot, and "the cases of those districts that rely on those opinions." Allen v. Juul, 278 So. 3d
783, 785 & 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
8. Larry R. Fleurantin, The Debate Continues on Whether to Remand Family Law Cases
with InadequateFindings, 86 FLA. BAR J. 27, 27 (2012). For further discussion of the preservation
issue, see generally Daniel A. Bushell, When Is a Motion for RehearingNecessary to Preserve
for Review a Trial Court's Errorin Failingto Make FactualFindings?, 93 FLA. BAR J. 46, 46

(2019).
9. 262 So. 3d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
10. Id. at793.
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decision is remarkable because it is an en banc decision that established
a clear precedent in the Fourth District." Subsequent to the Fourth
District's decision in Fox, the Second District decided Engle v. Engle
wherein the Second District joined Fox and certified conflict with the
other three district court opinions.1 2 Fox and Engle unequivocally raised
the tension between the Fourth District and Second District on one hand
and the other Florida district court opinions on the other hand. Now, it is
up to the Florida Supreme Court to resolve the conflict certified by Fox
and Engle and settle the law on this issue that is likely to reoccur.
This Article carefully examines the decision in Fox that receded from
Farghali v. Farghali,3 where a. three-judge panel departed from the
Fourth District's precedent that "the failure to make the [required]
statutory findings constitutes reversible error." 14 In particular, the author
uses the Fourth District's decision in Fox to illustrate why the prior panel
precedent rule must be adhered to even if a subsequent panel is convinced
that a case was wrongly decided.' 5 One of the original panel members of
the Farghalicourt changed his position and filed a concurring opinion in
Fox explaining why the majority's position is more persuasive from the
position expressed in Farghaliand Kuchera.16 Fox provides a careful and
well-reasoned analysis that considers reversible error versus
preservation.' 7 The author is convinced that the legal system will be better
served if Florida follows the rule established by Fox.18 Therefore, this
Article urges the Florida Supreme Court to approve Fox in order to
stabilize the judicial system and establish a binding precedent to promote
uniformity of law in Florida.
I. THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S EN BANC DECISION IN FOX

In Fox, the former husband argued that the trial court's failure to make
statutorily-required findings in an award of alimony is reversible error
whereas the former wife argued that the former husband did not preserve
the issue for appeal because he did not file a motion for rehearing to bring
the matter to the trial court's attention.1 9 The Fourth District took the
issue en banc to resolve a conflict within the district. 2 0 The conflict stems
from the Farghali's panel that departed from the Fourth District's
11. See id. at 791.
12. Engle, 277 So. 3d at 699 n.2 & 704.

13. Farghaliv. Farghali,187 So. 3d 338, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
14. Fox, 262 So. 3d at 791.

15. See infra Part 11.
16. Fox, 262 So. 3d at 795-96 (Conner, J., concurring) (citing Farghali, 187 So. 3d at 338;
also citing Kuchera v. Kuchera, 230 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)).
17. Id. at 794 (majority opinion).

18. See id at 791.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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precedent. 2 1 The Farghalicourt expressly adopted a First District's rule
that "a party is not entitled to complain that a judgment in a marital and
family law case fails to contain sufficient findings unless that party raised
the omission before the trial court in a motion for rehearing."2
- The court found that Farghali conflicts with the Fourth District's
earlier decisions that did not require a motion for hearing to preserve the
issue of sufficient findings. 23 In resolving the intra-district conflict, the
court adhered to its prior decisions and held that "the failure to comply
with the statute's requirement of factual findings is reversible error
24
The court
regardless of whether a motion for rehearing is filed."
therefore receded from Farghali and certified conflict with the other
district courts. 25
The en banc court noted that in Dorsett the Fourth District held that
the failure to make sufficient findings in an equitable distribution award
constitutes reversible error. 2 6 The Dorsett court acknowledged that both
27
Broadfootand Mathieu as having reached the opposite conclusion. Next
reviewed was the Third District's decision in Broadfoot that affirmed an
alimony award even though the judgment did not contain the statutorilyrequired findings on the ground that "the award was clear and supported
by the record." 8 In Mathieu, the Fifth District followed Broadfoot and
affirmed a dissolution judgment despite the lack of statutorily-required
findings because the husband failed to raise the issue in a motion for

21. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
22. The Farghalipanel departed from Fourth District precedent when the court followed

the rule established by Simmons v. Simmons, 979 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). See
Fox, 262 So. 3d at 792.
23. These earlier decisions held that the failure to make the statutorily-required findings
constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., Badgley v. Sanchez, 165 So. 3d 742, 744 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015); Rentel v. Rentel, 124 So. 3d 993, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Mondello v. Torres, 47 So. 3d
389, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Aguirre v. Aguirre, 985 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008);
and Dorsett v. Dorsett, 902 So. 2d 947, 950 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
24. Fox, 262 So. 3d at 791 (relying on Phila. Fin. Mgmt. of S.F., LLC. v. DJSP Enters.,
Inc., 227 So. 3d 612, 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); and then relying on In re Rule 9.331, 416 So. 2d
1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982) ("[A] panel of our court has no authority to overrule or recede from our
precedent on the same legal issue").

25. Id. at 791 n.1 (noting that because Kuchera v. Kuchera, 230 So. 3d 135, 139 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2017), followed Farghali,the court also receded from Kuchera).

26. Id. at 793.
27. Id. (citing Dorsett, 902 So. 2d at 950). Unlike Farghaliand Kuchera that departed from
binding precedent, all subsequent panels followed Dorsett as binding precedent. For example, in
2010, in Mondello, the Fourth District again expressed disagreement with Mathieu. Mondello, 47
So. 3d at 400 n.3. In Rentel, the Fourth District reversed and remanded an alimony award for

failure to make statutorily-required findings. Rentel, 124 So. 3d at 994. The Fourth District in
Badgley reiterated that the failure to make the statutorily-required findings warrants reversal,
citing Mathieu again as contrary authority. Badgley, 165 So. 3d at 744.

28. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
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rehearing. 2 9 Both Broadfootand Mathieu adopted an exception to the rule
that when the court's review is hampered, they may remand the case for
sufficient findings. 3 0
The en banc court further considered Owens where the First District
adopted Broadfootand Mathieu and held that because the appellant failed
to raise the lack of findings in a motion for rehearing, the issue is not
preserved for appellate review. 3 1 The court also reviewed the Second
District's decision in Esaw that affirmed the lower court based on a
failure to show harmful error or provide a transcript, noting the lack of
findings did not make the error fundamental. 32 In reaching its result, the
Esaw court acknowledged that the Fourth District has .disagreed with
Broadfoot and Mathieu.3 3
The en banc court stated that:
[d]espite the other districts' decisions requiring a party to file
a motion for rehearing to preserve the issue of a trial court's
failure to make statutorily-required findings in alimony,
equitable distribution, and child support, we adhere to our

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. (reviewing Owens v. Owens, 973 So. 2d 1169, 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Id (citing Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).
33. Id. (reviewing Esaw, 965 So. 2d at 1265 n.1). The conflict was also noted in the
concurring opinion. See Esaw, 965 So. 2d at 1268 (Silberman, J., concurring). But as previously
noted, the Second District in Engle followed Fox's reasoning and rejected the rationale offered.

by the other district courts. See Engle v. Engle, 277 So. 3d 697, 702 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). The
Engle court noted that Fox interpreted Esaw to have implicitly approved the preservation rule
established by Broadfoot and its progeny; however, the Engle court made it clear that was not the
case as evidenced by Judge Silberman's concurrence encouraging litigants to raise the issue in a
motion for rehearing since the Second District has not explicitly addressed the preservation issue.
See id. at 699 n.2. The Engle court found Fox's reasoning persuasive on several key points. First,
the court noted that allowing trial courts to fail to make the required findings "will create future
difficulty in subsequent modification proceedings" where the trial court has to determine whether
"there has been a material change in circumstances." Id. at 702 (citing Fox, 262 So. 3d at 79394). Second, remanding for the required findings is appropriate in these cases because the rules
were not designed to allow trial judges to ignore statutory requirements, as family law trial judges
should be aware of the findings that they are required to include in a family law judgment. See id.
at 703 (citing Fox, 262 So. 3d at 794). Third, because these cases involve families and children,
"foreclosing a litigant from raising" the issue on appeal for failure to raise the preservation issue
in a motion for rehearing not only "creates a procedural bar to achieving equity" but also "allows
trial courts to ignore specific legislative directives." Id. at 704 (citing Fox, 262 So. 3d at 794).
Fourth, the Engle court acknowledges that family law cases involve a large number of litigants
who appear before the trial court and the appellate courts pro se and therefore "this judicially
created rule may create a trap that not only has the potential to affect all family law litigants but
in practice could unduly affect pro se litigants." Id. (citing Fox, 262 So. 3d at 794). Hence, the
Second District, like in Fox, urged the Family Law Rules Committee to review and address the

issue. Id. (citing Fox, 262 So. 3d at 795).
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precedent that a party may raise the issue without having
previously filed a motion for rehearing. 34
The court reasoned that "the rules do not require the filing of a motion,
many dissolution appeals are pro se, and a family court judge should be
aware of the statutory requirements in rendering a decision on alimony,
equitable distribution, and child support."3 1
The court noted the distinction between dissolution of marriage cases
and other civil litigation. 3 6 Unlike in civil litigation where the final
judgment is the end of the litigation process, a final judgment of
dissolution "establishes ground zero for the purpose of petitions for
3 7 Without the
enforcement, modification, and contempt proceedings."
statutorily-required factual findings, "it is difficult, if not impossible," to
enforce a judgment or to justify a modification based on a material change
in circumstances. 3 8 The court reasoned that the refusal to review a trial
court's failure to make the required findings "frustrate[d] the very
purpose [of] those findings." 39 Because children and families are the
focus, a rule requiring a motion for rehearing "is too restrictive and
imprecise to operate fairly." 40 This is especially true where many family
court cases are handled pro se. "41
The majority addressed the dissent's suggestion that judicial economy
should prevail over children and family and that requiring a-motion for
rehearing was just a preservation issue. 42 The majority disagreed, noting
that "[t]he failure to make required factual findings is not the type of error
43 Likewise, "the
that preservation rules were designed to avoid."
preservation rules were not designed to allow a trial court to ignore
statutory requirements of which it should be aware."'
The court noted that while the failure to make the statutorily-required
45
findings may not be fundamental error, it is reversible error. The en
banc court, therefore, adhered to its prior precedent, approved the rule
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 793-94.

39. Id. at 794.

40. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
41. Id. at 794.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Id (stating that while a lawyer or a party should encourage the trial court to comply
with statutory requirements, it should not be a rule to require a party to bring the statutory
requirements to the trial court's attention in order to preserve the issue for appeal).

45. See id (citing Walden v. Adekola, 773 So. 2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (which
"revers[ed] a sanctions order for failing to contain a willfulness finding, which can be raised for

the first time on appeal")).

ThIE
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applied in Badgley, Rentel, Mondello, Aguirre, and Dorsett and receded
from Farghaliand Kuchera to the extent they departed from the Fourth
District's established precedent. 4 6 After addressing the merits of the
former husband's second issue-the trial court's refusal to allow him to
discover and present evidence on the former wife's employability-the
court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 4 7
Judge Conner issued a concurrent opinion noting, "After participating
in the panel decisions issued in Farghaliand Kuchera and considering
the various positions argued during the en banc consideration of this case,
I have come to the conclusion that the majority's position is more
persuasive." 48 Accordingly, he changed his position from that expressed
in Farghaliand Kuchera.49
Judge Kuntz also issued an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting
part. Unlike the majority that held that the failure to make the written
findings constitutes fundamental error, Judge Kuntz noted that "there is
no general rule that the lack of statutorily required findings constitutes
fundamental error." 5 0 Hence, the dissent would require parties to preserve
the issue for appellate review, as required in all other instances absent
fundamental error. 51
In the case at bar, the dissent found the former husband waived his
challenge to the court's alimony award, noting that the Farghalicourt
reached the correct conclusion when it adopted the rule used by the First
District in Simmons.5 2 The Simmons rule tracked the rule applied by the
other districts in Esaw, Owens, Mathieu and Broadfoot.53 The dissent
reviewed those decisions and found them to be persuasive, noting that the
rule adopted in Farghali stands for the proposition that the appellate
court's review is limited to issues raised before and ruled upon by the trial
court. 54 As a result, issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered. "The requirement that a party preserve an issue is based on

46. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 794-95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
47. Id. at 791.
48.

Id.

at 796 (Conner, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

49. Id
50. Id. at 799 (citing Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)) (brackets
omitted) (Kuntz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

51. Id. at 796.
52. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (Kuntz, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

53. Id. (citing Simmons v. Simmons, 979 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Esaw,
965 So. 2d at 1261; Owens v. Owens, 973 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2007); Mathieu v. Mathieu,
877 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (per curiam); Broadfoot v. Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584 (Fla.
3d DCA 2001)).
54. /d. at 798 (citing State v. Barber, 301 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1974)).
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55
fairness to the litigants, the court, and the judicial system." It is to allow
56
the judge and the opposing party an opportunity to correct the error.
The dissent took issue with the majority's statements that dissolution
cases are unlike civil cases and that "'it is equally, if not more, important'
57
that a court make findings in a dissolution case." The dissent pointed
out that "an exception to the preservation requirement exists for
fundamental error, not error this Court decides in a particular case to be
important."5 8 Because the former husband failed to preserve the issue of
adequate findings in a motion for rehearing or by other means authorized
by the rules, the dissent would affirm on this issue and recede from the
59
Fourth District's earlier decisions requiring a contrary result.

II.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. The PriorPanelPrecedentRule: Farghali's Analysis Was
Inconsistentwith Then-Binding Fourth DistrictPrecedent
In Farghali,a three-judge panel followed the First District's decision
60
in Simmons, but disregarded the Fourth District's binding precedent. In
effect, the Farghalipanel receded from Dorsett and its progeny that held
"the failure to make the [required] statutory findings constitutes
reversible error." 6 1 That was a violation of the prior panel precedent rule
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.331.62 If the Farghalipanel had looked to Florida
case law and Rule 9.331, it would have found that, as a subsequent panel,
the Farghalicourt was bound to follow Dorsett, which dictates a contrary
result from the one reached in Farghali.63
55. Id. (citing City of Orlando v. Birmingham, 539 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 1989)).
56. Id. (citing Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1978)). The dissent cited to several
Florida Supreme Court decisions that determined the failure to make required findings does not

constitute fundamental error. See State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 959 (Fla. 1994); Hopkins v.
State, 632 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1994); Seifert v. State, 616 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA), approvedin
relevantpart, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993).
57. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (Kuntz, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 791 & 792 (majority opinion).
61. Id.
62. FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.311 (2019).
63. See Fox, 262 So. 3d at 792 (citing In re Rule 9.331, 416 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982)).
There are proper ways a district court's precedent may be overruled or receded from, but the way
the Farghalipanel receded from Dorsett was not one of them. First, a Florida district court's
precedent may be overruled by an intervening U.S. Supreme Court or Florida Supreme Court
decision. See generallyRaoul G. Cantero, II1, Certifying Questions to the FloridaSupreme Court:
What's So Important?, 75 FLA. BAR J. 40, 40 (May 2002). When an intervening decision from the
U.S. Supreme Court or Florida Supreme Court implicitly overrules prior cases from the district

courts of appeal, courts often certify the issue to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification. Id.
The second way to overrule or recede from a precedent is by following the prior panel precedent

2HE DUEl BETWEEN REVERSIBLE ERROR AND PRESERVATION
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This author previously laid down the procedure to overrule or recede
from Dorsettif a subsequent panel is convinced that Dorsett was wrongly
decided: "[While] subsequent panels from the Fourth District must follow
Dorsett, which has the force of binding precedent, a future panel may
faithfully apply Dorsett's holding and recommend en banc review."
That is the procedure, but the Farghalipanel did not follow it. 65 Instead,
the Farghalipanel took it upon itself by receding from Dorsett and its
progeny in violation of Rule 9.331.66
B. The Fox DecisionRests on a Sound Analytical Framework
In December 2018, the Fourth District decided Fox, which
demonstrates that Dorsett was rightly decided and should be followed in
cases like Fox.67 Fox is a well-reasoned decision that considered the
Fourth District's earlier decisions 68 and the other district courts'
decisions, 69 with which Dorsettdisagreed. A close review of the decision
shows that Fox rests on a sound analytical framework.
In affirming the validity of Dorsett's holding, Fox made three
important points, explaining that appellate courts should not require
family law litigants to file a motion for rehearing to preserve for appeal
the lack of statutorily-required findings. 7 0 First, the rules do not require
family law litigants to file a motion for rehearing in order to preserve the
issue for appeal. 7 1 Although the Fourth District is not willing to impose
such a requirement, it will apply such a rule if it is adopted. Hence, the
en banc court stated that the Florida Bar Family Rules Committee may
address this issue, because of judicial economy, by adopting the rule
championed by the other district courts requiring a motion for rehearing
to preserve the issue of the lack of statutorily-required findings for
appeal. 72 "Absent such a rule, however, [the court] will not require a
motion for rehearing to 'preserve' the issue." 73 Second, as the Fox court

rule under Rule 9.331, which authorizes en banc review in order to maintain uniformity in
decisions when a subsequent panel disagrees with a prior panel. As an alternative to the suggestion
of en banc hearing, a subsequent panel could certify the issue to the Florida Supreme Court for

resolution. See State v. Johnson, 516 So. 2d 1015, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
64. See Fleurantin, supra note 2, at 30 (citing O'Brien v. State, 478 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1985)).
65. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
66. See In re Rule 9.331, 416 So. 2d at 1128.
67. Fox, 262 So. 3d at 794.
68. Id. at 792.
69. Id. at 793-94.
70. Id. at 793,794-95.
71. Id. at 793.
72. Id. at 795.

73. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
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74
says, "many dissolution appeals are [handled] pro se;" therefore, it does
not serve the end of justice to refuse to hear the issue on appeal just
because a litigant either forgot or failed to file a motion for rehearing. In
fact, the court reasoned that the failure to review the issue on appeal
75
"frustrates the very purpose for those findings." Third, it is not a burden
to require family law judges to comply with statutory mandates since
family law judges should be aware that Chapter 61 requires them to make
statutory findings in rendering decisions in cases involving alimony,
equitable distribution, and child support.7 6 There is no question that Fox
rests on a sound analytical framework, as it explains its position and
reaches its result after careful consideration of the other district courts'
opinions and the dissent's position.77
Another persuasive point made by the majority is the distinction
78
between dissolution of marriage cases and other civil litigation. After
the conclusion of an appeal at the district court level, a final judgment
may not be modified, altered, or amended except as provided by rules or
statutes. 79 "There is one [limited] exception to this absolute finality"that is Rule 1.540(b), "which gives the court jurisdiction to relieve a party
from the act of finality in a narrow range of circumstances." 80 Generally,
after one year, a civil litigant may not avail itself to Rule 1.540(b) to
attack a judgment. 81 That means civil ligation ends after the appellate
process runs its course. 82
Contrast that to final judgments in family law cases. The en banc court
recognized that after the final judgment, a family law litigant tends to file
83
petitions for enforcement, modification, and contempt proceedings. The
court is concerned that the lack of statutorily-required findings will
hamper review. 84 The court's concern is justified because it will be
difficult if not impossible to discern from the judgment the basis for
enforcement, modification, or contempt if the initial judgment lacks the
statutorily-required findings. 85
In the duel between reversible error and preservation, the majority's
position in Fox is more persuasive because it rests on firmer statutory

74. Id at 793.
75. See id. at 794.
76. FLA. STAT. § 61 (2019).
77. Fox, 262 So. 3d at 793-94.
78. See id. at 793.
79. De La Osa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 218 So. 3d 914, 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). See
also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.14.
80. Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1986).
81. See FLA. R. APP. P. 1.540(b)(1) (2019).
82. See id
83. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
84. Id. at 793-94.
85. Id
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grounds than the dissent's position. The lack of required findings "is not
the type of error that preservation rules were designed to avoid." 8 6 While
the court will not review unpreserved issues, it will not require a motion
for rehearing based on the preservation rules, which were not designed to
allow a trial judge to ignore statutory mandates. 87 The majority's position
is consistent with the court's responsibility with respect to the application
of alimony, equitable distribution, and child support statutes, which
mandate a trial court to make factual findings in family law cases. 88
According to the Fox majority, while the failure to make statutorilyrequired findings may not be fundamental error, it is reversible error. 89
The majority is concerned that the refusal to review a trial court's failure
to make the required findings frustrates the very purpose of those
findings, which are designed to protect children and families. 90
Because the majority admits that the lack of findings is not
fundamental error, the dissent takes the position that the preservation rule
should prevail when it comes to the failure to make factual findings.91
Both Broadfoot and Mathieu provided an exception that the appellate
court may at its discretion send the case back for findings if its review is
hampered. 9 2 According to the Fox dissent, the exception to the
preservation requirement addresses the majority's concern. 93 Because the
majority concedes that the lack of factual findings is not fundamental
error, the dissent would affirm on this issue and recede from the Fourth
District's earlier decisions requiring a contrary result. 94
In reaching its conclusion, the dissent relied on several supreme court
cases that determined the failure to make sufficient findings does not
constitute fundamental error. 95 The dissent cited to State v. Townsend, but
Townsend was not a case involving failure to make statutorily-required
findings in a family law case. 96 Rather, Townsend involved a criminal
defendant's failure to timely make contemporaneous objections under
86. Id. at 794.
87. Id.
88. For a thoughtful discussion on how the Fox decision meets the Fourth District's
responsibility respecting consequence, consistency, and coherence, see generally Larry R.

Fleurantin, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies in Immigration Cases: FindingJurisdictionto
Review Unexhausted Claims the Board of Immigration Appeals Considers Sua Sponte on the
Merits, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 301, 302 (2010).

89. Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 799 (Kuntz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

92. Mathieu v. Mathieu, 877 So. 2d 740, 741 n.I (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Broadfoot v.
Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
93. Fox, 262 So. 3d at 799 (Kuntz,

J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

94. See id at 799.
95. See id.; supra note 27 and accompanying text.

96. See Fox, 262 So. 3d at 799 (citing State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 959 (Fla. 1994)).
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of the Florida Statutes to the trial judge's failure to make
97
factual findings regarding reliability of child's statements. The dissent
also cited Hopkins v. State, but likewise, that case did not involve failure
98
to make statutorily-required findings in a family law case. Townsend
and the other cited cases were criminal cases where the defendants were
most likely represented by counsel whereas many dissolution appeals are
handled pro se. 99 Because Townsend and the cited cases did not involve
facts similar to Fox, reliance on those cases is misplaced.
C. The FloridaSupreme Court Should Approve the Rule Establishedby
Fox to Stabilize the JudicialSystem and Promote Uniformity of Law in
Florida
The Florida Supreme Court should approve Fox to promote
uniformity of law in Florida. Fox provided a well-reasoned analysis in
approving the rule applied in Dorsett and its progeny. While the author
acknowledges that an exception to the preservation requirement exists for
fundamental error, the way the exception is carved is not sufficient to
alleviate the majority concern. 1 00 The most salient impediment to the
exception adopted in Broadfoot and Mathieu is that it is up to the
discretion of appellate judges to send the case back for findings if the
court's review is hampered. 0 1 According to Judge Conner, the caveat
"can sometimes lead to speculation about what a trial judge was thinking.
Discerning the unspoken thoughts of a trial judge can be problematic,
when a trial judge's thinking is often dependent upon determining the
credibility of witnesses." 0 2 Different panels will reach drastically
different conclusions if it is up to an individual's judge discretion to send
cases back for findings. Hence, it is a valid concern that the caveat will
not be applied fairly and consistently.
CONCLUSION

This Article revisits the preservation issue in family law judgments
that lack statutorily-required findings. The en banc decision in Fox and
the Second District's decision in Engle unambiguously raised the tension
97.
98.
Hopkins
99.

Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 951.
See Fox, 262 So. 3d at 799 (Kuntz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 1994)).
Id. (citing Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 959 ("[Tlhe failure of a trial judge to make sufficient

findings under the statute, in and of itself, does not constitute fundamental error." (citing Hopkins,
632 So. 2d 1372; Seifert v. State, 616 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA), approvedin relevant part, 626

So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993); Jones v. State, 610 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992))).
100. Id. at 799.
101. See Mathieu v. Mathieu, 877 So. 2d 740, 741 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Broadfoot v.
Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
102. See Fox, 262 So. 3d at 796 (Conner, J., concurring).
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between the Fourth District and the Second District on one hand and the
other Florida district court opinions on the other hand. Because all Florida
district courts are unable to speak with one voice on this issue, the Florida
Supreme Court should resolve the conflict certified by Fox and Engle and
settle the law once and for all. 103
The Florida Supreme Court should approve the Fourth District's
decision in Fox and the Second District's decision in Engle because there
are no rules requiring family law litigants to file a motion for rehearing
to preserve for appeal the lack of statutorily-required findings in a trial
court's judgment. While we recognize all the district courts except the
Fourth District and the Second District adopted an exception to the
preservation requirement when it comes to fundamental errors, we cannot
leave it up to the discretion of a panel of appellate judges to send a case
back for findings if the lack of findings frustrates the court's appellate
review. Leaving it up to individual judges' discretion will lead to
speculation about what the trial judge was thinking and thus the exception
will not be applied fairly and consistently. Consequently, the Florida
Supreme Court should approve the rule established by Fox in order to
stabilize the judicial system and promote uniformity of law.

103 To date, the conflict certified by Fox and Engle has not been resolved. In fact, the Fourth
District recently applied the holding of Fox in Aponte v. Wood, 308 So 3d 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020). Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court has the last word either to accept jurisdiction to
resolve the conflict or recommend the Family Law Rules Committee to review the issue and
submit an amendment to the Family Law Rules of Civil Procedure for the supreme court's
consideration and approval in order to promote uniformity of law in Florida.

